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Abstract. This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which
responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation
was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff
that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared
to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers
is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation
based on cognitive dissonance is offered.
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1 Introduction
In ultimatum bargaining games, a proposer offers a division of a pie (say, 10
euros), which a responder can accept or reject. In the latter case, both parties
get zero. In laboratory experiments, small offers (say, 2 euros for the respon-
der) are frequently rejected.1 In the present paper, we investigate whether
and how responders’ behavior changes if they have to incur participation costs
before they can enter the ultimatum game.
Once the players have entered the ultimatum game, the participation costs
are sunk. Hence, these costs should have no influence at all if the players were
rational and interested in maximizing their individual monetary payoffs only.
Yet, the experimental evidence on standard ultimatum games suggests that
responders’ behavior might be partly based on inequity aversion and it might
also be affected by their perceptions of the proposers’ intentions.2 In order
to isolate the effect of the sunk costs on the responders’ behavior, we thus
endowed them with a show-up fee that was increased by the amount of the
participation costs and we made it clear to them that the proposers were not
aware of the fact that the responders had to incur participation costs.
Specifically, we modify an otherwise standard ultimatummini-game (where
proposers can choose between three possible offers) such that responders first
have to decide whether or not to participate. The participation cost is smaller
than the minimum payoff that a responder can guarantee himself in the ulti-
matum game. Our hypothesis was that in the presence of participation costs,
responders would show a higher inclination to accept low offers, because of a
desire to avoid having to justify for themselves why they chose to participate
in the first place. It turns out that the hypothesis is confirmed by the data.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which investigates
responder behavior in an ultimatum game with costly participation. In most
previous studies of ultimatum bargaining, players do not face any participa-
tion costs. And even if a prior investment stage is considered, the analysis
1See Gu¨th et al. (1982) for the original experiment and see Camerer (2003) for a review
of the extensive literature.
2Note, however, that the evidence might not be as robust as is sometimes suggested. In
particular, Stahl and Haruvy (forthcoming) have shown that the vast majority of behavior
in ultimatum games is consistent with individualistic preferences and subgame perfection
when the verbal presentation of the game is replaced by an abstract game tree. In our
experiment, we stick to the traditional verbal presentation.
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is typically focused on proposers’ behavior. For example, recently Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2005) conducted an experiment in which the proposer first
could generate potential gains from later trade through a nonrecoverable in-
vestment. The authors find that high-(sunk-)cost proposers tend to make
more aggressive offers, which could be explained by an increase in the pro-
posers’ perceived deservingness. Focusing also on perceived entitlement of
proposers but without considering prior monetary investments, Hoffman et
al. (1994) conducted an experiment in which a player could earn the position
of the proposer (by scoring high in a general knowledge quiz). In this case, the
authors find that proposers offer smaller amounts to the responders, which
could be explained by an increase in the proposers’ perceived deservingness.
Ruffle (1998), in turn, designed an experiment in which responders might be
perceived as more deserving, because they first have to participate in a contest
in order to generate the pie. The focus is again on proposer behavior, though,
and it turns out that offers to responders that are perceived as more deserving
are more generous. Furthermore, in a related line of research, experiments
on the so-called hold-up problem revealed that a party’s investment in the
creation of a pie tends to be rewarded in a subsequent bargaining stage, see
Hackett (1993) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a, 2004b).
Adding to this literature, but shifting the focus to the responders’ behav-
ior, our results suggest that a party who has sunk costs might actually be
willing to accept smaller offers in a subsequent ultimatum game in order to
avoid the feeling that the costs were incurred in vain. A possible explana-
tion for this phenomenon based on cognitive dissonance is proposed in the
discussion below.
2 Experimental Design
In the experiment, 10 euros had to be divided between a proposer and a
responder. There are two treatments. The first treatment is a standard
ultimatum mini-game with available offers “8:2”, “5:5”, and “2:8” (where
the first number denotes the proposer’s share). The second treatment is a
modification of this game, where the subjects in the role of the responder first
had to choose whether or not to enter the ultimatum game at a cost of 1.50
euros.
Subjects were randomly assigned to their roles and instructions were pro-
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vided at the beginning of each treatment.3 All subjects, except responders in
the participation-cost treatment, were given an initial endowment (or show-
up fee) of 5 euros. The responders in the participation-cost treatment were
given an endowment of 6.50 euros in order to ensure that, having paid 1.50
euros for participation, they decide on ultimatum offers at the same level of
total earnings as responders in the standard treatment. Moreover, proposers
in the participation-cost treatment were not informed about the existence of
the participation decision and responders were told that this was the case.4
The design with knowingly uninformed proposers was chosen in order not to
induce an increased feeling of responders’ entitlement.
In both treatments, the strategy vector method (Selten, 1967) was used
to elicit responder strategies.5 Note that our standard treatment corresponds
to experiment 6 in Stahl and Haruvy (forthcoming).
3 Results and Discussion
Results. The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory of
the University of Mannheim. In 10 sessions a total of 192 subjects participated
in the experiment: 94 subjects in the standard treatment and 98 subjects in
the participation-cost treatment. Average earnings were 9.15 euros and 9.39
euros, respectively. The specific results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2
below.
Offer made by accepted by rejected by
8:2 38.3% (18) 63.8% (30) 36.2% (17)
5:5 61.7% (29) 100% (47) 0%
2:8 0% 100% (47) 0%
Table 1. Observed behavior in the standard treatment; 47 observations;
absolute frequencies are shown in brackets.6
3The experiment was computer-based and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
The instructions and the computer program are available from the authors.
4Specifically, proposers simply were told that due to procedures they might not be
matched in which case the whole 10 euros would be theirs.
5Stahl and Haruvy (forthcoming) also use the strategy method. See also Oxoby and
McLeish (2004).
6Note that in the standard treatment, we have observed more “8:2” offers (38.3%)
and fewer rejections of such offers (36.2%) than Stahl and Haruvy (forthcoming) in their
4
In the participation-cost treatment, all potential responders chose to pay
1.50 euros for participation. Moreover, the rejection rate for the unfavorable
offer “8:2” drops from 36.2% in the standard treatment by more than 60% to
a mere 14.3% in the participation-cost treatment; this change is statistically
highly significant (p=0.002, one-sided binomial probability test).
Offer made by accepted by rejected by
8:2 36.7% (18) 83.7% (41) 14.3% (8)
5:5 59.2% (29) 98% (48) 2% (1)
2:8 4.1% (2) 100% (49) 0%
Table 2. Observed behavior with costly participation; 49 observations;
absolute frequencies are shown in brackets.
Discussion. Note that there should be no difference between the two treat-
ments if the responders considered the show-up fee as well as the participation
cost as sunk. Moreover, if neither the show-up fee nor the participation costs
were perceived as sunk, so that the responders were only interested in their
overall payoffs, then there should also be no difference between the treatments.
Apparently, the responders considered the show-up fee to be irrelevant, but
not the participation cost. Hence, it seems to be the fact that the responders
freely decided to incur the participation cost that makes a difference for their
willingness to accept small offers.
Specifically, the sunk-cost effect reflected in the data is consistent with
the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance (cf. Festinger, 1957).7 In
essence, cognitive dissonance refers to a kind of mental distress people expe-
rience from behavior that is inconsistent but freely chosen. In the experiment,
paying 1.50 euro for participation in the game as a responder but rejecting an
experiment 6 (15.4% and 46.2%, respectively). As is pointed out by Stahl and Haruvy,
subtle differences in the presentation of the game might play a role; moreover, there may
be cultural differences and in our experiment the stakes were somewhat higher because
we paid the subjects in euros instead of dollars. See also the closely related (ultimatum
mini-)game 3 in Brandts and Sola` (2001), who report substantially smaller rejection rates
than we have found.
7See Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) for a more recent discussion; see also Akerlof and
Dickens (1982) for a discussion of the economic relevance of the phenomenon.
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offer of 2 euros can be seen as an instance of such an inconsistency. Partici-
pation promises higher payoffs than non-participation; but then rejecting an
unfavorable offer would imply that the participation cost was incurred in vain
and freely so. Hence, responders are more inclined to ignore the “unfairness”
of the proposer. The observation that not all responders choose to accept
low offers in the participation-cost treatment could be explained by the fact
that despite an intended rejection of low offers, entering the ultimatum game
might be perceived by some subjects as a gamble worth paying for.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have made two contributions. First, we have added to the
literature on the ultimatum game. We have isolated a novel effect according
to which the presence of a participation cost can significantly reduce respon-
ders’ tendency to reject small offers in ultimatum bargaining. Since an agent
typically has to incur some investment costs in order to be needed by a prin-
cipal for the realization of a surplus, it might be an interesting avenue for
future research to explore if our result can be exploited by profit-maximizing
principals.8
Second, we have identified a simple framework in which a sunk cost effect
can be experimentally demonstrated. While conventional wisdom and anec-
dotes suggest that sunk costs do matter in the real world,9 it has recently
been pointed out by Friedman et al. (2007) that it can be quite difficult to
generate a sunk cost effect in the laboratory. Our results suggest that it
might well be easier to find a sunk cost effect if the effect does not lead play-
ers further away from rational behavior (predicted by traditional models with
individualistic preferences), but if instead it counterbalances deviations from
traditional models.
8Recall that if it were common knowledge that the responder has to incur a participation
cost, then the responder might be perceived as more deserving, so a low offer could be
regarded as being even more unfair (which might make rejections more attractive again).
9See Friedman et al. (2007) for a critical discussion of the existing evidence on the sunk
cost fallacy.
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